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This paper analyzes the role of the sharply increases in the minimum wage after 2004
in Uruguay in the slight decrease on wage inequality. We ￿nd no impact of the miminum
wage increases on wage inequality. This results can be explained by the low starting level
of the minimum wage or lack of compliance with it. The Uruguayan experience shows that
the minimum wage is not always e⁄ective as a redistribution instrument.
Keywords: minimum wage, wage inequality, IV, semiparametric estimation
JEL classi￿cations: J20,J31, J38
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza el rol del importante aumento del salario m￿nimo a partir de 2004
en Uruguay en la leve ca￿da en la distribuci￿n del ingreso. No encontramos impacto del
aumento del salario m￿nimo en la inequidad salarial. Este resultado puede ser explicado
por el bajo nivel inicial del salario m￿nimo o por la falta de cumplimiento del mismo.
La experiencia Uruguaya muestra que el salario m￿nimo no es siempre efectivo como
instrumento de redistribuci￿n del ingreso.
Keywords: salario m￿nimo, inequidad salarial, variables instrumentales, estimaci￿n
semiparamØtrica
C￿digos JEL: J20,J31,J381 Introduction
Uruguay introduced the national minimum wage in 1969 in order to establish a wage ￿ oor for
private workers over 18 years of age, with the exception of rural and domestic employees. The
government has discretionary authority to set it. During the nineties we observed a gradual
decline in the national minimum wage and simultaneously a tendency toward wage inequality,
while after 2004 the minimum wage increased sharply and earnings inequality dropped (see
the top panel in Figure 1). The real mimimum wage increased 154% between 2004 and
2009. This fact motivates us to address the question of the role of the minimum wage as a
redistributive policy. In particular, we analyze whether the variation in the minimum wage
(or "e⁄ective minimum wage") could explain the observed patterns in wage inequality in the
Uruguayan labor market. In other words, the aim of this study is to ￿nd out if there is a
causal relationship between the minimum wage and wage inequality.
From a theoretical perspective the impact of minimum wage on wage inequality could
go in either direction. In the ￿competitive supply-and-demand model￿the minimum wage
choice implies trade-o⁄s. On the one hand, a rise in the minimum wage could produce an
increase in the wage of individuals who are in the lower tail of the earnings distribution.
On the other hand, a minimum wage set above the ￿market-clearing price￿could lead to
an employment reduction usually called ￿employment e⁄ects￿of the minimum wage, thus
o⁄setting the gains and increasing inequality. In this context, the net e⁄ect depends on the
magnitude of gains and losses which arise from each e⁄ect, and the labor market alterna-
tives for those who become unemployed. Nevertheless, if the assumptions of the perfectly
competitive model do not hold, the predicted results could change considerably. In contrast
to the competitive model, when the employer has monopsony power, the predictions are
con￿ icting. In this case, we expect an increase in employment and wages when minimum
wage is set between the monopsony and the competitive level. In addition, the search and
matching models, which are based on the assumption of the presence of frictions in the labor
market that generates rents whenever a match between employee and employer occurs, do
not predict job losses as a result of a minimum wage increase and what is more, it also
contributes to a redistribution of the generated rent in favor of the employee (see Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994 and Boeri et al., 2008).Therefore, assessing the impact of the minimum
wage increases on wage inequality is ultimately an empirical question.
Beyond the theoretical framework selected, institutional factors play a determinant role
in assessment of the minimum wage and thus, making this kind of studies more complex.
As institutional factors we refer to the level of enforcement of the minimum wage law (for
1instance, by monitoring and applying fees when is not ful￿ll), the level of compliance and
the size of the informal labor market. There is no reason to expect minimum wage e⁄ects
if there is not enforcement rules which control the ful￿llment of the law. When there is a
dual labor market, one formal and another informal, the rationale behind the minimum wage
could be not as simple as in the one market case. Generally, the economic theory predicts
that the displaced workers from the formal labor market, which are those with a marginal
productivity below the minimum wage after it increases, go to the informal labor market. As
a consequence of this reallocation of workers from the formal to the informal labor market, in
this latter market wages tend to decrease and hence inequality rises. However, the empirical
evidence is not in line with the latter theoretical predictions and in some Latin American
(LA) countries wages in the informal labor market grow after a minimum wage increment.
This phenomenon is usually called the "lighthouse" e⁄ect, that is, the minimum wage works
as a reference wage in the informal sector so as to set a wage bargain.1 This explanation is
based on the assumption that informal workers have some bargaining power. Based on the
idea that the increase in wages of the informal sector may be "induced by signi￿cant sorting
and composition e⁄ects between the formal and the shadow sectors", Boeri et al. (2011)
developed and test an alternative explanation.
In regard to the e⁄ect of minimum wage on wage inequality in Uruguay, GonzÆlez and
Miles (2001) analyze the e⁄ect of a 56% decrease in real terms of the minimum wage (4.7%
the yearly average) in the wage structure during the period 1986 -1997. Following a non-
parametric quantile regression approach, they conclude that the decline in the minimum
wage does not explain the increase in wage inequality. Furthmore, they observe an upward
movement of the lower conditional quantile which implies a negative link between the lower
tail of the distribution and minimum wage. They argue that this result could be explained
by the e⁄ect of sector bargaining, or by the low level of compliance with the minimum wage.
Instead of using the statutory minimum wage as a redistributive tool, the government em-
ploys it as a policy instrument to reduce (or control) government expenditure since it was
indexed to social security variables such as unemployment insurance, pensions and income
taxes. Between 1985 and 1991 the minimum wage that matters in terms of the wage struc-
ture resulted from a sectorial wage bargaining process between employers and employees. In
2005, with the introduction of the BPC (Bases de Prestaciones y Contribuciones) which is
the new reference measure for social security bene￿ts, the national minimum wage began
to be used as a redistributive tool. Additionaly, the statutory minimum wage has increased
1Souza and Baltar, (1980) were the ￿rst in explaining and denoting this fact as "Efeito Farol" ("lighthouse
e⁄ect"). Maloney and Nunez (2004) provide empirical evidence of this e⁄ect for LA countries.
2dramatically since 2005.
Based on the previously described picture, this research seeks to analyze the e⁄ect of
the minimum wage on wage inequality observed during the period 1996-2009. This period is
particulary interesting because the national minimum wage dropped slighlty between 1996
and 2004 and after that it increased 153% in real terms between 2004 and 2009, 26% the
yearly average. These facts provide us with a better identi￿cation strategy which is based
on the variation of the relative minimum wage over time and across regions. It necessary
to point out that between 1996 and 2004 the national minimum wage was not being used
with redistributive purpose. After 2004, the national minimum wage was reintroduced as a
redistributive policy and turned out to be an important feature in the labor market. Thus,
our research could be considered an assessment of the contribution of the ￿new minimum
wage￿ to wage inequality. In other words, we investigate the e⁄ectiveness of the recent
increase of the minimum wage as a redistributive tool.
In order to analyze the impact of the minimum wage on inequality, we use the theoretical
model proposed by Lee (1999). Lee developed a model which explains the theoretical rela-
tionship between percentile gaps (for instance the 10th - 70th percentile gap) across states
and over time and the "e⁄ective" minimum wage (minimum wage less the 70th percentile).
From an empirical point of view, the variation of the latter measure across states and over
time enables him to identify the "latent" wage inequality that arises after accounting for
the e⁄ective minimum wage. In the case of the United States, there is a national minimum
wage, but each state also sets a federal minimum wage and therefore has the advantage of an
additional source of minimum wage variation. In Uruguay, there is only a national minimum
wage despite the fact of di⁄erent costs of living across regions. Thus, our identi￿cation strat-
egy is to focus on two possible sources of variation: 1) the variation of the national minimum
wage across time, which as we mentioned experienced great variability in recent years; and
2) the oustanding variability of percentile gaps between and within regions. The percentile
gap variation between regions emerges from the di⁄erent living costs as mentioned above.
One important advantage of Lee·s methodology is that it takes into account spillover
e⁄ects.2 This fact is relevant for two main reasons: 1) some contracts are set as multiples
of the minimum wage and 2) in 2005 the sector bargain was reinstated by the government
and hence the minimum wage could be considered as the basis for negotiation. Despite Lee￿ s
treatment of the employment e⁄ect on the model, one possible limitation of this methodology
is its capacity to account for it. The main problem is that this approach (like others including
2Flinn and Mabli (2008) provide a theoretical basis for the presence of spillover e⁄ects of the minimum
wage.
3Dinardo et al. decomposition) is based on observed wages. If we suppose that the competitive
model applies and the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium wage, some employees
will lose their jobs and therefore we will not observe their wages. In this context, what we
observe indeed is a rightward shift of the wage density which could enhance spillover e⁄ects
as Lee states.
This paper is relevant because the literature is not de￿nitive about the impact of the
minimum wage on wage inequality. For developed countries, the empirical evidence on the
employment e⁄ects of the minimum wage is not unanimous. Card and Krueger (1994)
and Dickens and Manning (2002) do not ￿nd negative e⁄ects of the minimum wage on
employment in the US and the UK, respectively. The former authors consider that the
standard competitive model may fail to predict labor market outcomes because it relies on
a ￿number of simplifying assumptions￿ . In addition, Manning (2003) argues that employers
have monopsony power because of ￿frictions in the labor market,￿and questions whether the
standard model of perfect competition properly predicts labor market outcomes. Recently,
Addison, et al. (2008) ￿nd robust positive employment e⁄ects for the U.S. Retail-Trade
Sector. In contrast to those ￿ndings, Neumark and Wascher (2007) review the existing
literature for the US and other developed countries and ￿nd that there is greater evidence
which supports the existence of negative employment e⁄ects -disemployment e⁄ects- on low-
wage workers.
For some Latin American countries, the literature on this subject is quite mixed. For
instance, Fajnzylber (2001) analyzes the case of Brazil for the period 1982-1997 using the
Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey (longitudinal data). He ￿nds employment elastic-
ity of around -.10 for low-wage workers in the formal sector, and between -.25 and -.35 for
low-wage workers in the informal sector. With the same survey, but considering a slight
larger period 1982-2000, a di⁄erent methodology and also considering the whole labor force,
Lemos (2004) ￿nds "small adverse e⁄ects on employment". Furthermore, Lemos (2005) ￿nds
employment elasticity from -.12 to .02 and from -.29 to .12 using OLS and IV, respectively.
Neumark et al. (2006) realize a similar result to that of Lemos (2005) for the period 1996-
2001, ￿nding an estimated employment elasticity of -.07 for household heads and positive
results for other family members. On the other hand, Lemos (2009) ￿nds no evidence of
employment e⁄ects in the formal and the informal sector. Bell (1997) analyzes the case
of Colombia. Using time series data (Annual Industrial Survey 1980-1987), she ￿nds an
estimated employment elasticity of -.34. When she uses panel data (Minimum Wage Com-
mission 1980-1987), the results range from -.24 to -.03 for skilled workers and from -.33 to -.14
for unskilled workers. Maloney and Nuæez (2004), using ￿panel employment data,￿obtain
4an estimated employment elasticity of -.15. The ￿nal research of this review is a study of
Chile, conducted by Montenegro and PagØs (2004) using ￿repeated cross-section household
surveys￿(1960-1998) for Santiago. They ￿nd negative employment e⁄ects for young and
unskilled workers, but positive e⁄ects for women.
Furtado (2005) analyzes the Uruguayan case for the period 1986- 2001 by estimating
employment elasticities. Using a cointegration vector, she does not ￿nd robust employment
e⁄ectss arguing that the national minimum wage is a useless redistributive tool. This result
is also in line with the ￿ndings of GonzÆlez and Miles (2001). Moreover, Kristensen and
Cunningham (2006) develop a minimum wage ranking for Latin American and Caribbean
countries (adjusted by USD PPP) for 1998. Of 19 countries, Uruguay is in the last position
of this ranking. This could be another explanation for the absence of employment e⁄ects.
So, although the zero employment e⁄ect hypothesis· seems to be reasonable for Uruguay,
further research on this issue is required.
To carry out this research we construct panel data at the Department level using the
National Household Survey from 1996 to 2009 and we focus on males to avoid selection
issues. First, we estimate Lee·s model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as he does in his
research paper. As this estimate is probably biased because of a spurious correlation between
the percentile gap and the relative minimum wage we go one step further, implementing an
IV estimation method. In order to do so, we obtain data of the wage percentiles between
1996 and 2009 by Department from the Social Security records. The IV method enables
us to mitigate endogeneity which could arise due to simultaneity. Additionally, we estimate
a semiparametric linear partial modelling following Yatchew (1998). In the OLS case, we
￿nd that the increase in the minimum wage contributes to the reduction of wage inequality.
Nevertheless, using intrumental variables and a semiparametric estimator the latter result
tends to disappear.
The result of absence of e⁄ect, could be explained by several factors. For instance, despite
the substantial rise in the minimum wage, it was previously set in a very low level relative
to other Latin American countries, as Kristensen and Cunningham (2006) state, and to the
average wage (in 1996 the ratio of minimum wage to average wage was around 15%, while
in 2009 it was 30%). Also, the minimum wage policy depends on the level of enforcement.
Regarding this issue, we observe that the level of compliance declines when the minimum
wage is reintroduced, and therefore to e⁄ectively apply this kind of policy, enforcement
should also be enhaced. Finally, the net e⁄ect will depend on whether there are employment
e⁄ects.
52 Methodology
With the purpose of identifying the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on the wage distribution we
follow the methodology developed by Lee (1999). This research is an empirical application
of Lee·s theoretical model, which was implemented for the US case in order to ￿nd out the
contribution of the minimum wage to the increasing wage inequality observed during the
eighties, adapted for the Uruguayan case. Speci￿cally, he takes advantage of the variation
in the wage distribution and the (federal) minimum wage across states to identify the e⁄ect
of the minimum wage on ￿latent￿wage dispersion ￿the wage dispersion that would have
resulted in the absence of the minimum wage. Hence, this methodology allows us to answer
the question: How would the wage dispersion evolve once we account for the impact of the
minimum wage on the wage distribution? Despite the fact that in Uruguay the minimum
wage is only set at national level, the wage distribution varies greatly throughout the dif-
ferent Departments of the country. Therefore, our identi￿cation strategy is based on wage
di⁄erential across departments and time. Contrary to the US study, here we are interested
in assessing the reintroduction of the minimum wage on the wage dispersion.
The ￿rst step of this methodology is to establish the formal relationship over time and
across Departments between the observed wage dispersion measured by the di⁄erence be-
tween percentiles of the (log) monthly wage distribution (for instance, the 10th - 70th per-
centile gap) and the ￿e⁄ective minimum wage￿(following the example, (log) monthly mini-
mum wage ￿70th percentile). In addition, we also have to consider the linkage between the
"latent" wage dispersion and the relative minimum wage.The connection among these three
measures depends on the assumption about spillover and disemployment e⁄ects. Without




































where the term w
pth
it ￿ w70th
it represent the observed wage inequality (or percentile gap)
in Department i and in time t, while the term (w
pth
it ￿ w70th
it )0 represents the latent wage






. As the minimum wage only varies across time it is only indexed with the
letter t. The mechanism is similar to the one observed in a censored model. In the ￿rst
case, where the relative minimum wage is less than the latent wage inequality, the observed
6percentile gap is equal to the latent wage inequality. In other words, the relative minimum
wage is rather low compared to the ￿latent￿wage distribution and therefore is not relevant
in the determination of wages. This probably occurs in high-income Departments. On the
other hand, the second line in equation (1) states that when the ￿latent￿wage inequality
is less than the relative minimum wage, the observed wage inequality equals the relative
minimum wage. This fact is expected in low-income Departments since we observe a sort of
bite in the wage distribution of those Departments around the minimum wage, as we will
see in the next section.
When we introduce some re￿nements to the model and allow the presence of spillover

















it )0. In this case, if the
￿rst inequality of equation (1) holds, the observed wage inequality is an increasing function
of the relative minimum wage, re￿ ecting that the latter a⁄ects the wage distribution despite
being below the latent wage inequality, but this e⁄ect tends to disappear as the e⁄ective
minimum wage increases. In our case, the spillover e⁄ects assumption is quite reasonable
since, as we mentioned, the minimum wage in some cases is based on some contracts and
sector bargains.
Regarding the employment e⁄ect, Lee discuss how its presence could a⁄ect the model.
Since the analysis is based on observed wages, when a person loses his job due to the
employment e⁄ect, we lose an observation because we do not observe his/her salary anymore.
Thus, this fact could be associated with a shift in the wage percentiles which could be modeled
in a similar way as spillovers and therefore, could lead to an "overestimation of true spillover
e⁄ects." In the most realistc scenario, we might expect the presence of both e⁄ects.
Up to this point, the censored model represented in equation (1) is not yet estimable. It
is necessary to ￿gure out a parameterization which describes properly the model presented
above. Lee expresses the observed wage inequality as a function of the relative minimum
wage and the latent wage inequality. That is, (w
pth
it ￿w70th





Then our second step is reduced to parameterize the latter function, taking into account that
there are di⁄erent ways to do so. For instance, Lee (1999), Autor, Manning and Smith (2010)







it ) ￿ [(mwt ￿ w70th
it ) + (mwt ￿ w70th
it )2]. In our case, the data does not support
the quadratic term. We try the inclusion of a quadratic term in our estimation but in all
cases it was not statistically di⁄erent from zero. In the US case, which is studied in Lee
(1999) and in Autor, et al. (2010), their analysis is based on the 50 States (in some cases
fewer). Bosch et al. (2010) study the Mexican case using as the unit of analysis the di⁄erent
7municipalities, working with about 63 municipalities. In our case, we have 19 Departments




it )0 = (w
pth
it ￿ w70th
it ) ￿ (mwt ￿ w70th
it ).
One important issue which we also need to address in this approach is election of the
percentile of reference. In the illustration of the model above we select the 70th percentile.
The question that arises is: why we should choose the 70th percentile instead of other wage
percentiles? For example, Lee justi￿es the use of the median wage in the US case because he
￿nds evidence which supports the idea that the median wage is not a⁄ected by the minimum
wage. However, and as we previously mentioned, the spillover e⁄ects hypothesis probably
holds and therefore the median wage could not be an adequate choice. Hence, we opt for
the 70th percentile as the reference wage (which is more similar to the Mexican case).
Finally, we relax Lee·s assumption which states that the latent wage dispersion is equal
across Departments, letting the latter vary across Departments by the inclusion of Depart-
ment ￿xed e⁄ects and year e⁄ects in the model. Then, the equation to be estimated can be















where i represents the unit which is Departments, t is the year, w
pth
it ￿w70th
it is the observed
percentile gap between the pth percentile and the 70th percentile of the wage distribution
for Department i and year t, (mwt ￿w70th
it ) is the e⁄ective minium wage which varies across




i are the year e⁄ect and the Department ￿xed
e⁄ect when choosing the pth percentile, and u
pth
it is a Department time-varing error for





i ). This regression is structured to capture the e⁄ects of
aggregate factors and Department speci￿c responses to aggregate factors. The parameter of
interest is ￿
pth which measures the e⁄ect of the relative minimum wage on the percentile gap
(pth - 70th). For instance, if p=10 the parameter ￿
10th captures the e⁄ect of the relative
minimum wage on the percentile gap w10th
it ￿w70th
it , and so on. We estimate equation (2) for
p=10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80 and 90. The estimation of equation (2) for the 80th and 90th
percentile represents a robustness check since we do not expect that the minimum wage has
an impact on the top percentiles. Stated di⁄erently, both coe¢ cents ￿
80th and ￿
90th have to
be statistically equal to zero so as to be con￿dent about our estimates.
An additional robustness check is the inclusion in equation (2) of control variables by De-
partment in order to control by other factors that could a⁄ect the percentile gap. Moreover,



















where ￿pth trend is a general time trend (associated with the pth percentile) and x0
it is
a vector of control variables which vary across Department and over time. Equation (2)
and (3) are our parametrization of model (1). Our objective is to mimic Lee·s censoring
model by estimating these equations and then observing whether predictions can shed light
on the contribution of the minimum wage to wage equality. The model predicts that when
(mwt￿w70th
it ) increases the percentile gap w
pth
it ￿w70th
it will be similar to the former and when
(mwt ￿ w70th
it ) decreases the percentile gap w
pth
it ￿ w70th
it will approximate to the latent wage
inequality. These are the kinds of predictions that the model produces.
One of the major concerns in the estimation of the above equations arises from the
possibility of spurious positive correlations between the observed percentile gaps and the
e⁄ective minimum wage which could emerge due to sampling error and the fact that the
seventh percentile is in both sides of equation (2) and (3), which Autor, et al. (2010) refers
to the "division bias problem" citing Borjas (1980). It could be that there is no relationship
between those measures but because of measurement errors, estimation could incorrectly ￿nd
a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect. These sources of bias have to be mitigated in
order to avoid misleading estimates. So, attempting to resolve this issue, Lee uses a trimmed
mean, which is the wage mean excluding the bottom and top 30 percent of the sample
by year and state, to compute the relative minimum wage. One possible drawback of this
strategy is arbitrariness in the exclusion of percentages at the top and bottom. Additionally,
as we expect spillover e⁄ects, we focus on the 70th percentile and thus we have to impose
other criteria of sample exclusion which will also be arbitrary and su⁄er from sampling error.
Moreover, Autor et. al. (2010) show that this does not entirely solve this problem and thus
this source of bias remains.
Therefore, one possible solution is to estimate equations (1) and (2) using the IV method
(in Autor et al., 2010 and Bosch et al., 2010) the authors also address this sampling error
issue by using IV). In this context, our variable to be instrumented is the e⁄ective minimum
wage and our instrument will be the e⁄ective minimum wage but constructed using the 70th
percentile of the wage distribution of the Social Security records. That is, the instrument
3Another possibility is to include Department speci￿c time trend to allow Departments to follow di⁄erent
trends due to other factors that are unrelated to the e⁄ective minimum wage. However, in this case we have
not an appropiate time span length so as to account for the e⁄ect of speci￿c Deparment trends.
9is the same measure but it comes from other sources of information. The strategy of using
external information to account for measurement error is common practice when the data is
available. For instance, Card (1996) employs external information to adjust his estimates in
his research on the e⁄ect of unions on wages.
In both equation (2) and (3) we state that the wage dispersion (the dependent variable)
is linearly a⁄ected by the e⁄ective minimum wage and thus imposing an speci￿c parameter-
ization. Therefore, we will test if the latter assumption holds by not placing any particular
functional form and using nonparametric techniques to estimate a general function. In this
context, we estimate a semiparametric regression model developed by Yatchew (1998). Then,
















in where ^ vit are the predicted values from the ￿rst stage regression and f (￿) is the
function which is estimated nonparamterically. The rest factors are set parametrically. After
the estimation of equation (4), we test the null hypothesis of parametric speci￿cation of f
against the nonparametric alternative hypothesis as described in Lokshin (2003).
3 Data
In order to undertake this research we use the yearly Uruguayan National Household Survey
(Encuesta Continua de Hogares, ECH) from 1996 to 2009, which is conducted by the National
Statistical O¢ ce of Uruguay (Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica, INE). The ECH has been the
main source of socio-economic information about Uruguayan households and their members
at the national level since 2006, when it started to include rural areas. Prior to this year, the
ECH only covered urban areas of the country. So as to have a comparable sample throughout
the di⁄erent years, our sample unit is the capital city of each Department which represents
around 80% of the total labor force in the Department, and therefore is representative of the
whole work force in each of them. Then, we refer to our data as a panel at the Department
level.
Moreover, the selected sample is composed of male wage earners between 14 (minimum
legal working age) and 60 years old. Despite the fact that the government sets a di⁄erent
monthly minimum wage for the rural and domestic sectors , we do not exclude them because:
1) we only consider urban areas, so there is a negligible proportion of rural workers and their
minimum wage is similar to the national minimum wage; 2) the minimum wage in the
10domestic sector is set just above the national minimum wage, thus there is not an important
di⁄erence between the two (see Furtado 2005 for a similar discussion). We keep out the
public sector because the national minimum wage is not relevant for those workers. Finally,
we also exclude the ￿rst and the ninty-ninth percentiles to avoid outliers.
The ECH has information on monthly salaries net of social security and income taxes of
each household member, from which we construct the monthly salary percentiles by Depart-
ment. We have 19 Departments and a time period of 14 years and hence our sample size
is 266. We merge this data with the information about the monthly minimum wage which
is set by the government and usually changes slightly two times during one year and so we
take the lastest value in each year.
In Table 1 we present some summary statistics of several variables in 1996, 2004, 2005 and
2009. Between 1996 and 2004, the di⁄erent percentile salary gaps (e.g. 10th - 70th percentile
gap) tend to increase. When we compare 2004 with 2005 (year in which the minimum wage
was reintroduced, we observe a decline in the salary gaps. By the end of the analyzed period,
apart from the 10th - 70th percentil gap, they continue decreasing.
Figure 1 (bottom panel) presents the evolution of the 20th, 70th and 90th percentile
relative to the median throughout the period 1996-2009, which arises from a regression
of each percentile gap (which vary across Department and time) on Department and year
dummies weighted by the number of observations of each Department. As we observe in the
lower plot, the ninth percentile increases reaching a peak in 2002, then it ￿ uctuates until 2005
and after that it declines, increasing again during the last year of the period. A similar but
more attenuated pattern is followed by the 70th percentile. Related to the 20th percentile
gap, it almost shows an opposite pattern. What is interesting is that this percentile gap
shows a upward trend after the increase of the minimum wage in 2005.
Concerning to the e⁄ective minimum wage, it increases from -1.910 to -1.272 between
1996 and 2009 as we observe in Table 1. We also construct an additional indicator like
the minimum wage - average or (median) monthly wage ratio - in order to account for the
rise in the minimum wage related to the average and median wage. These ratios increase
throughout the period. Speci￿cally, between 1996 and 2009, the ratio almost doubles when
we consider the average wage and increases ￿fty percent when considering the median wage.
Despite the remarkable rise in the minimum wage, it is still far from the median as well as
from the mean. For instance, in 1998 Paraguay and Colombia has a ratio of just over 0.70
and 0.5, respectively, as Kristensen and Cunningham (2006) observe. They also ￿nd that
in 1998 the Uruguayan minimum wage was one of the lowest in the region. Based on these
facts one can argue (and also assume) that there is no employment e⁄ect of the minimum
11wage as a result of a minimum wage increase or if there is, it probably is negligible.
Another interesting labor market feature, which emerges from the observation of Table
1 is that the percentage of workers below the minimum wage grows sharply - this could be
related to compliance and enforcement issues. A di⁄erent explanation is that in developing
countries the informal labor market represents around one fourth of the total labor market.
Nevertheless, Maloney and Nuæes (2004) and Kristensen and Cunningham (2006) point out
that for many Latin American nations the minimum wage has a potential impact on both
the formal (or covered) sector and also on the informal (or non-covered) sector. Moreover,
they argue that the minimum wage seems to have a stronger e⁄ect on the latter than on the
former sector. This phenomenon is usually called the ￿lighthouse e⁄ect￿and it occurs when
minimum wage is relevant for the informal sector (where minimum wage law does not apply).
Additionally, in a recent paper Khamis (2009) ￿nds that minimum wage has stronger e⁄ects
on the informal labor market, where workers experience considerable wage increases, than
on the formal labor market.
In this research we use the de￿nition of informality elaborated by the International Labour
Organization (Organizaci￿n Internacional del Trabajo, OIT) in the 15th International Con-
ference of Labour Statisticians (1993), which considers informal workers those who work in
the domestic sector, unpaid household members, private wage earners working in a ￿rm with
less than ￿ve employees and self employed workers (excluding administrative, professionals
and technicians). Between 1986 and 2000, the ECH provides information on the size of
workers ￿rm. Since 2001, the question about the ￿rm·s size is discrete: 1) 1 employee; 2)
between 2 and 4 employees; 3) between 5 and 9 employees; 4) between 10 and 49 employees;
and 5) more than 50 employees. Therefore, we can identify small companies of 4 or less
workers.
As our sample only includes private employees, informal workers are de￿ned as those
who work in small ￿rms (four or less employees) and workers in the domestic sector. The
proportion of informal workers rises between 1996 and 2004 and after that it declines from
25% in 2004 to 18.5% in 2009. Below the minimum wage, 65% and 44% are in the informal
labor market in 1996 and 2009, respectively. Therefore, compliance could tell part of the
increment in the proportion of workers below the minimum wage. We also observe that our
sample is composed mainly of full time workers. Below the minimum wage, the proportion
of full time workers decreases as is commonly expected. However, this proportion increases
from 1996 to 2009 from 35% to 51%. Neumark (2008) states that when analyzing data of
developing countries he ￿nds that ￿enforcement of and compliance with minimum wage laws
is often erratic.￿
12Finally, we observe that the average age is around 35 and that education increases almost
one year during the 1996-2009 period.
As we mentioned earlier, we also use Social Security data which was obtained from the
Social Security O¢ ce (Banco de Previsi￿n Social, BPS). BPS is a state o¢ ce which is in
charge of pensions, social bene￿ts, employment insurance and collecting the social security
tax. Employers are responsible for paying the social security tax which is calculated using
the nominal salary. Then, the BPS has the salary records of the employees for the whole
formal labor market. The o¢ ce provided us with a panel set that includes the percentiles by
Department and between 1996 and 2009. In Table 1 we also present statistics of the percentile
salary gaps of the Social Security records. Using the BPS data, overall, the same pattern is
observed as when using the ECH data. Finally, we also observe that our instrument, that is,
the e⁄ective minimum wage constucted using the 70th percentile of Social Security records,
increases until 2005 and after that it falls.
Our identi￿cation strategy is based on variability across Departments and time. Lee has
two sources of variation. First, each state has its own minimum wage, and the second is that
Lee observes that the minimum wage is more or less binding according to the level of income
of each state. In order to illustrate how the identi￿cation strategy could work properly with
our data, we plot the variation of the 10th - 70th percentile gap in Figure 2. As we can see,
each dot represents a Department percentile gap and the line is a nonparametric ￿t. We
observe an interesting variability of our data across and within departments.
In addition, in Figure 3 we plot the kernel density of the relative (log) monthly salary by
income region.4 Depending on the income we generate three groups: 1) high income group
which includes the Departments of Canelones, Colonia, Maldonado, Montevideo, Paysandœ
and Rocha; 2) medium income group which includes the Departments of Durazno, Florida,
Salto, San JosØ, Soriano, Tacuaremb￿ and Treinta y Tres; and 3) low income group which
includes Artigas, R￿o Negro, Cerro Largo, Lavalleja, Rivera and Flores. In the top panel of
Figure 3 we have the (log) monthly wage relative to the median for the high income region
and we do not observe any bite around the minimum wage in either year, which is not a
striking feature in a high income region labor market. In the medium income region there
is also no bite but the minimum wage in 2009 is closer to the mean. Finally, in the lower
panel we observe that in 2009 the minimum wage is relevant for the (log) monthly wage and
could be related to a support e⁄ect. In Figure 4, in where we also add an histogram to the
4We use the Epanechnikov kernel function and the Sheather-Jones (SJ) plug-in bandwidth. Our concern
here is to detect if the minimum wage represents a feature in the labor market and that is the reason why
we choose the SJ plug-in. Dinardo, et al. (1996) use it to estimate the actual and counterfactual (log) wage
density.
13kernel density estimation, we observe some sort of bit in the level of the minimum wage in
the case of the low income region.
4 Results
Table 2 presents our OLS estimates of equation (2) and (3) for the di⁄erent percentiles gap
using the ECH data and the Social Security records (BPS data) for the whole sample and
also separating between formal and informal workers in the case of the ECH sample. Using
the ￿rst source of data (the ECH), we ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of the relative
minimum wage on the 10th percentile through the 60th percentile and the coe¢ cent declines
when we consider higher percentiles. This result suggets the presence of spillover e⁄ects.
Interestingly, we do not ￿nd statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects for the top percentiles gap (80th
and 90th) as we expect in the model. Another striking point is that the coe¢ cent increases
in magnitude for all the percentiles except for the 10th percentile when we consider a general
trend and controls variables by city in column (2). Moreover, the e⁄ective minimum wage
has a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the 80th - 70th percentil gap which could
be explained by the sources of endogeneity that bias the OLS estimates. Overall, the same
picture arise when separately estimate equation (2) and (3) for formal and informal workers.
However, in this latter case the sources of bias appear to be greater than when we consider
the full sample. Using the BPS data, the results are overall quite similar. However, we
observe a greater e⁄ect on the 30th, 40th and 50th percentile in the two speci￿cations and
negative but not statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on the 80th percentile gap. As previously
indicated, this result could be spurious because of the "division bias" problem.
In Table 3 we estimate the impact of the relative minimum wage on wage inequality using
instrumental variables.5 First, we consider the full sample and we ￿nd that the e⁄ective
minimum wage has a signi￿cant impact on the 10th, 20th, 40th and 60th percentile gap at
the 5% level. For instance, the ￿
10th is equal to 0.603. When we include a general trend
and also control variables by city, this e⁄ect tends to decline in magnitud and in the level at
which they are statistically signi￿cant except for the 10th percentile gap. It is important to
point out that our instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous variable (the e⁄ective
minimum wage), as we can see in the weak identi￿cation test of Kleibergen-Paap presented
5As mentioned the estimations are carried out using yearly data. Additionaly, we also estimate equation
(2) and (3) using quarterly data. The results go in the same direction but in this case the e⁄ect appears
to be statistically signi￿cant in both cases with and without control variables by city and general trend.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that when using quarterly panel data additional issues arise like
seasonality and what is more, the measurement error problem tend to increase.
14in Table 3.6 Moreover, we include the p-value of the intrumental variabel of the ￿rst stage
regression.
In the second case, that is, the estimation using only formal males we ￿nd a similar
picture. However, the e⁄ect of the relative minimum wage on wage inequality tend to disap-
pear. The ￿rst stage continue being appropiate to carry out an IV procedure. We also try
using only informal workers but we do not ￿nd any e⁄ect for the di⁄erent speci￿cations. In
this last case, we seem to have weak identi￿cation problems. So as to overcome this prob-
lem, we estimate model (1) and (2) using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
estimator which seems to perform better than the conventional IV estimator when using a
weak instrument. In addition, as in the presence of weak instrument we tend to under-reject
the null hypothesis of absence of e⁄ect, we also apply the Anderson-Rubin test to perform
robust inference (which is not showed in Table 3). Results do not change.
In Figure 5 we graph the IV estimates of model (2) for the 10th percentile gap and for all
males in 1996 and in 2009, which are weighted by the number of observation by Department.
In 1996, we observe a ￿ at relationship between the 10th relative percentile and the relative
minimum wage as is expected since the minimum wage has been reaching its lower level ever
since. Despite the fact that the minium wage increases considerably, in 2009 there is not a
clear positive slope in our estimates. However, the 2009 estimates are closer to the 45￿ line.
A problem could arise because of the absence of a linear relationship between the percentile
gap and the e⁄ective minimum wage which could bias our estimates. Lee also includes the
square of the e⁄ective minimum wage. In our case, we also include a quadratic term but it
is not statistically signi￿cant.
In order to test the non-linear hypothesis, we estimate equation (4) using the semipara-
metric procedure developed by Yatchew (1998). This kind of strategy relaxes the assumption
of imposing a linear or quadratic relationship on the percentile gap and relative minimum
wage. On the other hand, we cannot estimate the parameter of interest ￿
th because of the
non-parametric nature of this approach. In order to avoid the division bias problem we use
the predicted value of the ￿rst stage regression as mentioned in the methodology section.
Figure 6 presents the nonparametric function that arise from estimating equation (4) for
the di⁄erent percentile salary gaps for the whole sample. At the same time, we plot the linear
estimation which emerge from the IV estimates. As we observe in the di⁄erent graphs, the
nonparametric estimates seems to produce a similar result as in the linear case and thus, our
6The Kleibergen-Paap test of weak identi￿caiton is commonly used when the assumption of i.i.d. errors
is no longer valid, as in our case. In addition, we use the rule-of-thumb that the Kleibergen-Paap statistic
should be above 10 in order not to have weak identi￿cation problems.
15parametrization seems to be quite reasonable. Interestingly, as we consider a higher relative
percentile, the relationship tends to be ￿ at and almost negative for the top percentiles. This
results could be considered as an additional robustness check since it is doubtful to expect
a positive relationship between top percentiles and the minimum wage.
In Table 4 we test the null hypothesis of linear parametrization against the nonparametric
alternative. In almost all cases, we cannot reject the linear parametrization and therefore
the linear speci￿cation ￿ts the data similarly to the nonparametric speci￿cation.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our empircal application is aimed to shed light on the contribution of the recent sharply
increase in the mimimum wage on the slight decline in wage inequality. Using an
instrumental variable estimation we ￿nd that, overall, the boost of the minimum has
no signi￿cant impact on wage inequality. This results could be explained by several
facts: 1) the low starting level of the minimum wage; 2) the high economic growth and
the low unemployment experience by the country in the last years; 3) compliance and
enforcement of the minimum wage law. Finally, the Uruguayan experience shows that
the minimum wage is not always e⁄ective as a redistribution instrument. One short-
coming of this study is that we do not take into account the potential disemployment
e⁄ects of the mimimum wage. However, economic growth in Uruguay has been vigorous
since 2003 and the unemployment rate at the end of the 2000s is in the lowest historical value.
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18Table 1. Summary Statistics
ECH data 1996 2004 2005 2009
(log) monthly minimum wage (MW) - 1997 pesos 6.63 7.18 7.82 8.40
10th - 70th percentile gap -1.23 -1.32 -1.29 -1.31
20th - 70th percentile gap -0.93 -0.97 -0.95 -0.91
50th - 70th percentile gap -0.34 -0.37 -0.36 -0.36
90th - 70th percentile gap 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.57
MW - 70th percentile gap -1.91 -1.85 -1.28 -1.27
MW / Average monthly wage (%) 16 16 29 30
MW / Median monthly wage (%) 22 23 40 40
Workers below the MW (%) 2 5 10 11
Informal worker (%) 23 25 24 18
Informal workers below the MW (%) 65 48 53 44
Full time workers (%) 80 82 82 83
Full time workers below the MW (%) 35 47 43 51
Average age 34 36 36 36
Average education 9.0 9.9 10.0 9.9
Social security data 1996 2004 2005 2009
10th - 70th percentile gap -1.64 -1.82 -1.63 -1.76
20th - 70th percentile gap -0.94 -1.10 -0.87 -1.00
50th - 70th percentile gap -0.37 -0.38 -0.35 -0.38
90th - 70th percentile gap 0.61 0.68 0.64 0.54
MW - 70th percentile -1.28 -1.15 -0.63 -0.76
Sources: National Household Survey (ECH) and Social Security data.
19Table 2. Impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality. OLS estimates
ECH data ECH data- Formal ECH data- Informal Social Security data
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
p10-p70 0.434*** 0.401*** 0.389*** 0.248*** 0.390** 0.584*** 0.378*** 0.412***
(0.127) (0.117) (0.108) (0.086) (0.140) (0.128) (0.104) (0.106)
p20-p70 0.350*** 0.378*** 0.396*** 0.330*** 0.305*** 0.498*** 0.201* 0.236**
(0.086) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.066) (0.081) (0.113) (0.091)
p30-p70 0.285*** 0.335*** 0.344*** 0.296*** 0.264*** 0.446*** 0.743*** 0.767***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.076) (0.061) (0.073) (0.053) (0.048)
p40-p70 0.287*** 0.324*** 0.317*** 0.295*** 0.192*** 0.323*** 0.541*** 0.556***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.044) (0.062) (0.055) (0.072) (0.048) (0.052)
p50-p70 0.186*** 0.206*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.167*** 0.298*** 0.410*** 0.418***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.038) (0.051) (0.054) (0.068) (0.039) (0.035)
p60-p70 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.159*** 0.176*** 0.115*** 0.188*** 0.262*** 0.280***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.029) (0.039) (0.055) (0.053)
p80-p70 0.033 0.070** 0.055** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.191*** -0.052 -0.044
(0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.041) (0.049) (0.058) (0.045)
p90-p70 0.005 0.113 0.058 0.219*** 0.310*** 0.373*** 0.122 0.143
(0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.073) (0.059) (0.064) (0.124) (0.105)
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
City e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend-controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.510 0.520 0.576 0.162 0.224 0.788 0.882
Sample period 1996-2009
Note: Each row represents the marginal e⁄ects of the e⁄ective minimum wage on the respective percentile
gap. Robust standard errors clustered at city level reported in parenthesis. All models include year e⁄ects.
Controls by city include: average years of education, unemployment rate, proportion of workers by age
intervals (14-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50), proportion of workers by sector(industrial, building, transport &
communication, ￿nancial & services, others). All the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number
of observations by Department and year.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
20Table 3. Impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality. IV estimates
All Formal Informal
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
p10-p70 0.603** 0.460* 0.456*** 0.278* 0.052 -0.227
(0.273) (0.243) (0.146) (0.151) (0.779) (0.602)
p20-p70 0.354** 0.260** 0.246*** 0.128 0.360 0.132
(0.175) (0.131) (0.078) (0.107) (0.628) (0.375)
p30-p70 0.175 0.110 0.176** 0.111 0.367 0.162
(0.132) (0.136) (0.069) (0.102) (0.526) (0.297)
p40-p70 0.179** 0.144* 0.119** 0.064 0.079 -0.001
(0.075) (0.080) (0.058) (0.074) (0.315) (0.227)
p50-p70 0.057 0.008 0.109* 0.066 0.044 -0.041
(0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.069) (0.219) (0.144)
p60-p70 0.120** 0.080* 0.038 0.040 0.117 0.060
(0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.130) (0.090)
p80-p70 -0.016 -0.042 -0.022 -0.028 0.262 0.236
(0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.056) (0.234) (0.149)
p90-p70 -0.160 -0.201 -0.055 -0.015 0.204 0.249
(0.145) (0.131) (0.183) (0.168) (0.226) (0.186)
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 266
City ￿xed e⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend-controls Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paan weak identi￿cation test 34.3 35.1 44.7 54.4 3.9 7.7
First Stage: Instrument p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.012
Sample period 1996 - 2009
Note: Each row represents the marginal e⁄ects of the e⁄ective minimum wage on the respective percentile
gap. Robust standard errors clustered at city level reported in parenthesis. All models include year e⁄ects.
Controls by city include: average years of education, unemployment rate, proportion of workers by age
intervals (14-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50), proportion of workers by sector(industrial, building, transport &
communication, ￿nancial & services, others). All the regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number
of observations by Department and year.
* signi￿cant at 10 %; ** signi￿cant at 5 %; *** signi￿cant at 1 %.











* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
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